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Like other European Nations, Switzerland has signed 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Not 
being part of the European Union, however, it has 
pursued a different approach to climate policy than 
the rest of Europe. The cornerstone of Swiss climate 
policy is carbon pricing, but this comes in three ver-
sions that involve different actors and carry different 
price tags. In addition, a number of support schemes 
are in place, e.g., for the development of renewables 
and insulation of buildings. In this article, however, 
we focus on Swiss carbon pricing. 
Switzerland has one of the highest carbon taxes 
in place worldwide. Currently, this tax is CHF 96 per 
ton of CO2 equivalent.
1 The tax is levied on fossil fuels 
as they cross the Swiss border. However, there are 
important exemptions. Importantly, the tax applies 
to combustion fuels but not to transportation fuels. 
There are ongoing discussions in the Swiss parliament 
about extending carbon pricing to the transport sec-
tor, which is responsible for a third of total green-
house gas emissions in Switzerland, and which is the 
only sector where emissions have remained constant 
(FOEN 2020). 
With the aim of protecting the interests of en-
ergy-intensive firms, the Swiss government has in-
troduced two programs that allow firms to be ex-
empt from the CO2 tax. The first was established in 
2008 and can be described as a collaborative com-
mand-and-control instrument coupled with an abate-
1 At the time of writing, the Swiss Franc (CHF) is close to par with 
the US Dollar (1 CHF = 1.03 USD). 
ment subsidy. To join the program, firms in energy-in-
tensive industries subject themselves to a set of spe-
cific abatement measures and emissions targets that 
are developed in cooperation with energy experts. If 
a firm’s emissions are below its target in a given year, 
it can sell the difference as “over-abatement” for a 
fixed fee. This program is known as “nonEHS”2 and 
currently includes around 1,200 firms. 
The second exemption program is an emissions 
trading scheme, which was introduced in 2013 and 
currently includes 53 plants. The system is called CH 
EHS and has been designed to link it with the Euro-
pean Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Due 
to lengthy political negotiations, the linking of the 
systems was delayed for several years, but it finally 
took place on January 1, 2020. 
In this article, we describe the three competing 
carbon pricing programs that co-exist in Switzerland 
and the limited information that  is available about 
their effects on emissions. We furthermore provide 
preliminary results about the relati ve effectiveness 
of the CH EHS and nonEHS programs based on our 
ongoing work. 
THE CO2 TAX
Swiss climate policy is based on the Federal Act on 
the Reduction of CO2 Emissions (“CO2 Act”),
3 which 
has been updated several times since its inception 
in 2000. Originally, the CO2 Act focused on meeting 
the Kyoto Protocol commitment of overall GHG emis-
sions reductions of eight percent during the 2008–
2012 period, relative to the 1990 baseline. There have 
been a number of updates to the CO2 Act, and it is 
currently in the process of revision to shape climate 
policy after the year 2020. The agency in charge of 
implementing the CO2 Act is the Swiss Federal Of-
fice for the Environment (FOEN). For additional scien- 
tific and political background related to Swiss climate 
policy, see Brönnimann et al. (2014).
Figure 1 shows the sectoral distribution of GHG 
emissions in the EU and in Switzerland. This dif-
ference in the emissions portfolio is important for 
understanding the diverging 
approaches to climate policy. 
Emission trading schemes are 
well suited for large, station-
ary emission sources such as 
power plants. Because Switzer-
land has only few installations 
that are large enough to be in-
2   EHS is the German acronym for Emis-
sionshandelssystem, or emissions trad-
ing system. The system is called 
nonEHS to differentiate it from the 
CH EHS. 
3   This is known as the “CO2 Gesetz” 
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cluded in an ETS, its main climate policy instrument 
is the CO2 tax. 
The CO2 tax on fossil heating and process fuels 
was introduced in 2008. It is collected by the Fed-
eral Customs Administration at the border crossing 
(there are no fossil fuels produced in Switzerland). 
Two-thirds of the collected revenue is redistributed 
to households (on a per capita basis) and to firms (in 
proportion to their payroll). The remainder is used 
to pay for a building energy efficiency program and 
a technology fund. The tax was introduced at a level 
of CHF 12 per ton of CO2, along with a set of interim 
abatement targets. Compliance with these targets is 
assessed periodically, and non-attainment triggers 
an automatic increase in the CO2 tax in multiples of 
CHF 12 per ton of emissions. Table 1 shows the tax 
rate evolution, along with the prices for some of the 
most important fossil fuels. 
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the 
CO2 tax. Since everyone is affected either by the levy 
or one of the two exemption programs, no control 
group exists that could provide a credible counter-
factual. Furthermore, the fuel use of firms and house-
holds subject to the tax is only recorded on aggregate 
because the levy is imposed at the border and simply 
becomes part of the total price. Individual quantities 
of fuel use are recorded only for firms that are exempt 
from the tax. 
The most recent quantitative analysis of the 
effect of Swiss CO2 tax on emissions is by Ecoplan 
(2017). This study estimates the effect of the CO2 tax 
on firms and households by means of a time series 
analysis. The authors conclude that from 2008 to 
2015, the tax led to a reduction of 6.9 million tons 
of CO2, which corresponds to 4.4 percent of the re- 
levant combustion emissions during that period. 
Figure 2 shows the emissions reductions based this 
model. The estimated effect of the tax increased over 
time. In 2015, the reduction was computed as 1.8 mil-
lion tons, corresponding to just over 10 percent of 
the relevant emissions. About two-thirds of the re-
duction is due to households, whereas the remain-
der originates from firms that are not exempt from 
the tax. 
These results rely on the assumption that the 
time trend (capturing demographic changes, tech-
nological progress, etc.) before the introduction of 
the tax also applies to the period after 2008, and 
that no important drivers of emissions are included. 
Both assumptions are essentially not testable. For 
example, if issues related to 
climate change became more 
salient during the Kyoto period 
of 2008–2015, then the trend 
in the absence of the tax may 
have steepened, which would 
lead to an overestimate of the 
effect. If, on the other hand, 
unobservable variables (such 
as a shift in demand unrelated 
to the tax) led to a relative in-
crease in emissions, then the 
effect of the tax would be 
understated. At any rate, the 
tax appears to have an effect, 
whatever its exact size, and 
this effect increases as the tax 
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Figure 2
N tes: The solid line sh ws the resul s obtained by the time series analysis, and the dashed l ne those 
from the CGE model. The vertical axis measures the reduction in CO2 emissions in million tons.
Source: Ecoplan (2017) in collaboration with EPFL and FHNW.  © ifo Institute
Table 1 
Fuel Prices and CO2-Related Surcharges
Unit 2008 2009 2012 2014 2016 2018
CO2 tax (CHF/tCO2) 12 24 36 60 84 96
Heating oil EL Market price (CHF/kg) 0.990 0.560 0.894 0.766 0.385 0.612
Surcharge (CHF/kg) 0.038 0.076 0.114 0.190 0.265 0.303
Natural gas Market price (CHF/kg) 0.519 0.240 0.394 0.334 0.201 0.347
Surcharge (CHF/kg) 0.032 0.064 0.096 0.160 0.224 0.256
Hard coal Market price (CHF/kg) 0.158 0.076 0.087 0.069 0.058 0.090
Surcharge (CHF/kg) 0.028 0.057 0.085 0.142 0.198 0.227
Propane Market price (CHF/kg) 0.836 0.510 0.811 0.617 0.286 0.532
Surcharge (CHF/kg) 0.036 0.072 0.108 0.179 0.251 0.287
Note: The market prices reflect international exchange prices and do not include the Swiss CO2 tax. 
Source: Prices from Thomson Reuters Datastream (Heating oil: Gasoil 0.2% sulphur FoB ARA; Coal: API2 Cif ARA; Gas: TTF; Propane: North Sea NWE FoB). Surcharge 
computed based on emission factors from FOEN. 
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THE CH EHS
The Swiss Emissions Trading Scheme (CH EHS) was 
introduced in 2013. By 2018, it included 53 plants 
that together emitted 4.577 million tons of CO2 (FOEN 
2019a). According to the Swiss Greenhouse Gas Inven-
tory (FOEN 2020), this accounts for 27 percent of the 
emissions from combustion that are subject to the 
CO2 Act and for 13 percent of total emissions in Swit-
zerland. By sector, the largest emitters are cement 
plants, followed by plants in the chemical, refining, 
district heat, metal, and paper sectors. The major-
ity are mandatorily included in the CH EHS, whereas 
four additional plants have opted into the system.4 
More details about the CH EHS are provided by FOEN 
(2018a). In what appears to be a design flaw, CH EHS 
firms received some of the redistributed revenue from 
the CO2 tax (along with households and small firms), 
despite being exempt from it (EFK 2017).
The cap is set relative to the Kyoto period and 
reduced by an annual factor of 1.74 percent (this cor-
responds to the reduction rate in the EU ETS). EHS 
firms receive most of their emission allowances al-
located for free. The distribution of free allowances 
across sectors is guided by harmonized allocation 
rules based on the benchmarks of emissions perfor-
mance. Five percent of the annual cap is retained as 
a reserve for new entrants, whereas the remaining 
95 percent is distributed at no cost. Plant closures 
lead to an adjustment of free allocation but not of 
the total cap, as these allowances are added to the 
reserve. Any unused allowance reserve is auctioned 
in the following year. Figure 3 shows the cap, free al-
location, and emissions in the CH EHS. 
As no secondary allowance market has emerged 
in Switzerland, the clearing prices from the biannual 
auctions are the only price signal available in the CH 
EHS. The auction prices are shown in Figure 4, along 
with the price of EU allowances. Despite the planned 
4 These are plants owned by firms that also have other plants in the 
CH EHS. 
linking of the two systems, the price in the CH EHS 
does not closely track the price in the EU ETS for 
much of the sample period. A likely reason for this is 
the absence of a secondary market, making it difficult 
for financial intermediaries to exploit arbitrage op-
portunities between the Swiss and European carbon 
prices. Firms in the CH EHS were allowed to cover 
some of their emissions using international offsets, 
which further contributed to the system’s over-allo-
cation and to the low auction prices. The recent in-
crease in the allowance price is most likely due to the 
reforms in the CH EHS and the linking that took place 
in January of this year. Despite the over-allocation 
and the low financial incentives to abate, however, 
emissions in the CH EHS did decrease over time, as 
can be seen in Figure 3. In 2018, the total emissions 
within the CH EHS were 17 percent lower than in 2013. 
A part of this decrease may have been due to the fact 
that many of the included firms face additional com-
mand-and-control measures at the cantonal level. 
THE NONEHS PROGRAM
There are three conditions a firm must meet in order 
to be eligible for the nonEHS program: First, it must 
belong to a pre-defined set of energy-intensive in-
dustries. Second, its emissions must not be too large, 
as otherwise it would be included in the CH EHS (see 
above). And third, its emissions must not be too low. 
More specifically, if a firm has a sufficiently large in-
stalled heat capacity or emits at least 100 tons of CO2 
per year, it can apply for an exemption from the CO2 
tax.5 The process of exemption from the CO2 tax is 
shown in Figure 5.
There are two subtypes of the nonEHS program. 
In the first, firms agree to subject themselves to a 
particular set of abatement measures, whereas in the 
second, they additionally agree to specific emissions 
targets. Both the abatement measures and the emis-
sion targets are developed in close cooperation with 
energy experts from the Energy Agency of the Swiss 
Private Sector (EnAW) and the 
Cleantech Agency Switzerland 
(act). The proposed measures 
and targets are then submitted 
for approval to FOEN. Only the 
abatement measures and emis-
sion paths that are deemed 
“economically viable” are in-
cluded in the agreement, thus 
ensuring that firms are not 
forced to engage in very costly 
5   This inclusion threshold is currently 
being revised. According to the most 
recent proposal by the Swiss senate, 
firms are eligible to join the nonEHS 
program if their CO2 tax expenditure 
exceeded CHF 10,000 in the previous 
year. As the CO2 tax increases, this me-
ans that the inclusion threshold in 
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Information about the cap available at https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/en/home/topics/climate/in-
fo-specialists/climate-policy/emissions-trading/swiss-emissions-trading-scheme--ets-.html.
Source: FOEN (2019a). © ifo Institute
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abatement measures.6 In 2018, the number of firms 
in the nonEHS program was 659, of which 505 had 
explicit emission goals, whereas the remaining 154 
firms were subject to specific abatement measures 
(FOEN 2019b).
Firms are legally required to carry out the agreed 
measures and to reach their emission targets in order 
to be exempt from the CO2 tax. The nonEHS program 
is therefore a firm-specific command-and-control 
approach. Such an approach could, in theory, per-
form as well as a market-based measure in terms of 
aggregate abatement costs, and even outperform it 
if the process of defining the abatement measures 
informs firms about their available options. On the 
other hand, developing firm-specific measures and 
targets can be costly. Since firms pay for the services 
provided by EnAW and act, the costs to the govern-
6 For production and processing facilities, a measure is deemed eco-
nomically viable if the investment pays for itself within four years, 
based on the investment cost and the energy prices, including the 
CO2 tax. For investments in building insulation and heating equip-
ment, the required payback-period is eight years (FOEN 2018b, p. 80). 
ment accrue in the form of lost 
revenue from the CO2 tax. Ta-
ble 2 shows emissions and the 
foregone tax revenue by year. 
Through 2018, the total loss 
in tax revenue was CHF 1,017 
million. 
In addition to the fore-
gone tax revenue, the govern-
ment actively subsidizes firms 
to over-comply. If participants 
in the nonEHS program reduce 
their emissions by more than 
what is mandated in their 
agreement, they can sell the 
surplus in the form of certifi-
cates to a government-owned 
fund. The rate at which the 
certificates were purchased ranged between CHF 40 
and CHF 100 during the first five years of the program 
but has been fixed at CHF 100 since 2013.7 Through 
2018, the total amount of over-compliance was 3.8 
million tons of CO2, which corresponded to a total 
subsidy payment of CHF 296 million (column 5–6 in 
Table 2). In addition to the foregone revenue and the 
subsidy costs, the nonEHS also has administrative 
costs as FOEN regularly needs to monitor and verify 
compliance of all participating firms (Rütter soceco 
2016).
The effectiveness of the nonEHS program in terms 
of emissions reductions is difficult to assess, both 
in absolute terms (as there is no untreated control 
group) and relative to non-exempt firms (as no emis-
sions information is available for the latter). To ob-
tain indicative results, we can refer to two sources. 
The first is a report commissioned by FOEN (TEP En-
ergy 2016), which surveyed firms subject to the tax 
or one of the exemption mechanisms with respect 
to climate-relevant decision-making. Exempt firms 
reported that they carried out 
more measures for emissions 
reductions than firms paying 
the tax. However, large firms 
and firms with a high emission 
intensity were more likely to 
both seek exemption and to 
engage in significant abate-
ment measures. This self-selec-
tion of “motivated” firms into 
the nonEHS program means 
that we cannot assign a causal 
interpretation to these results. 
Second, we can focus on 
engineering estimates pro-
7   If firms exceed their emissions goal, 
they can cover up to eight percent of 
their emissions using international off-
sets (FOEN 2018b). No firm in the pro-
gram emitted in excess of 108 per cent 
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vided by EnAW (2019) that are the basis for determin-
ing the abatement measures and emissions goals. 
Figure 6 shows the target emissions path for nonEHS 
firms (blue line) and their actual emissions (yellow 
line), both indexed to 2012. This graph suggests that 
the nonEHS program was responsible for an emissions 
reduction of 11.7 percent between 2012 and 2018. 
However, it is not clear that the engineering estimates 
appropriately reflect the emissions in the absence of 
the nonEHS program, because some the abatement 
measures would probably also have been carried out 
if firms were subject to the CO2 tax or in the course of 
general technical change. For example, the installation 
of LED lights is the most frequent abatement meas-
ure agreed to by firms, but LED lighting is becoming 
ubiquitous. In general, it is not clear that the agreed 
measures are additional in the sense they would not 
have happened if firms had to pay the tax. After all, 
implementing these measures would currently reward 
non-exempt firms by CHF 96 per ton of emissions, 
and this value is set to further increase in the future. 
For this reason, not all of the emissions reductions 
implied by the EnAW model can be interpreted as the 
effect of the nonEHS program per se. 
THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF THE EHS 
VS. NONEHS PROGRAMS
As mentioned above, it is impossible to cleanly iden-
tify the effect of either the tax or one of the exemp-
tion programs due to data availability. What is feasi-
ble, however, is to compare the effect of the EHS vs. 
nonEHS programs on emissions. In an ongoing and 
yet unpublished study, we focus on firms that were 
part of the nonEHS program in 2008–2012. A subset 
of these firms was transferred to the CH EHS in 2013, 
whereas the others remained in the nonEHS program. 
This allows for the identification of the differential 
effect of these programs using a “difference-in-dif-
ferences” framework. Because nonEHS firms receive 
CHF 100 for every ton of CO2 
that they abate, whereas EHS 
firms obtain only the value of 
an allowance (which is much 
less), we expect nonEHS firms 
to engage in a greater effort 
to abate emissions than EHS 
firms. To ensure comparabil-
ity across years, we focus only 
on emissions that were regu-
lated throughout the sample 
period.8
8   We restrict the emissions to “regu-
lar” fossil fuels. In contrast, process 
emissions have been regulated only 
since 2013, along with emissions asso-
ciated with process heat and waste.
Table 2 
Emissions, Lost Tax Revenue, and the Value of Subsidies Paid to nonEHS Firms
Year Emissions Tax Revenue loss Offset amount Offset value Government cost
 (Mt CO2) (CHF/tCO2) (Million CHF) (Mt CO2) (Million CHF) (Million CHF)
2008 2.95 12 35.4
2009 2.70 24 64.7
2010 2.89 24 69.4
2011 2.77 24 66.6
2012 2.69 36 96.7
2013 1.57 36 56.7
2014 1.49 60 89.3
2015 1.62 60 97.4
2016 1.65 84 138.9
2017 1.67 84 140.7
2018 1.68 96 161.4
2008-2012 14.0 332.7 3.1 220.7 553.5
2013-2018 9.7  684.3 0.8 75.4 759.7
Total 23.7 1'017.1 3.8 296.1 1'313.2
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Figure 7 shows the differential treatment effect 
on emissions (EHS minus nonEHS) by year. Although 
we do find a positive coefficient (i.e., a lower abate-
ment effort) for a subsample of EHS firms, the aver-
age effect for the full sample is close to zero and not 
statistically significant. The results suggest that the 
nonEHS program may be no more effective than a 
regular EHS in terms of reducing emissions. However, 
we stress that this is work in progress. 
DISCUSSION
Switzerland exempts firms in energy-intensive sec-
tors from paying the carbon tax with the argument 
of protecting their competitiveness and thus saving 
domestic jobs. Whereas the introduction of the CH 
EHS is consistent with EU climate policy, the tax and 
the nonEHS program are special to Switzerland. This 
program benefits firms in two ways: (i) They do not 
have to pay the CO2 tax, and (ii) they receive a subsidy 
for reducing their emissions below an emissions tar-
get that was not particularly stringent. It is thus not 
surprising that industry representatives favor this pro-
gram and would like to see a reduction in the thresh-
old to join, but it is also clear that the nonEHS pro-
gram imposes significant costs on society. Between 
2008 and 2018, the monetary costs from the foregone 
revenue and the subsidy payments amounted to CHF 
1.3 billion, and additional costs accrue every year in 
the form of monitoring and compliance. These costs 
have to be compared to the benefits of the program. 
Whereas firms in the nonEHS program indeed 
reduced their emissions, the available empirical ev-
idence does not imply that the program per se was 
more effective in terms of abating emissions than 
the CH EHS or the tax. This is not surprising from an 
economics point of view as the opportunity costs of 
emitting CO2 are identical for a tax and a subsidy of 
equal size: If a firm in the nonEHS reduces emissions 
by one ton, it receives the subsidy. If a firm subject to 
the tax reduces emissions by 
the same amount, it saves the 
tax. The marginal incentive to 
reduce emissions is therefore 
the same, so it is not clear why 
the nonEHS program would be 
expected to perform better in 
terms of emission reductions. 
Whether it has saved jobs is 
not obvious either given the 
high level of employment in 
Switzerland. In any case, we 
are not aware of any empiri-
cal work that investigates the 
employment effects of the 
nonEHS. 
Proponents of the nonEHS 
argue that there is a value of 
informing firms about availa-
ble abatement options and providing expertise (e.g., 
via agencies such as EnAW and act). We very much 
agree, but this expertise could also be provided with-
out a tax exemption, because firms should be inter-
ested in reducing emissions to avoid paying the tax. 
By 2018, 266 firms had used the energy consulting 
services from EnAW to define voluntary emissions tar-
gets without becoming exempt from the tax (EnAW 
2019). A different argument holds that firms pay 
more attention to money they can earn than to tax 
payments they can avoid. This is possible subject to 
some behavioral assumptions, but such a clear pref-
erence for realizing gains rather than avoiding losses 
should materialize in measurably greater emissions 
reductions by nonEHS firms relative to firms in the 
CH EHS. However, we do not find this to be the case 
in our ongoing work. 
For these reasons, we argue that current propos-
als to reduce the inclusion threshold for the nonEHS 
program should be considered with caution. Exempt-
ing more firms from paying the tax not only adds to 
the regulatory cost, but it further concentrates the 
burden of climate policy on households and small 
firms in exchange for uncertain benefits. We believe 
that distributional concerns should be considered 
when fighting climate change and that energy-inten-
sive firms are expected to share at least some of the 
cost of climate policy. 
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